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Abstract—Data available on the Web, such as financial data
or public reviews, provides a competitive advantage to companies
able to exploit them. Web crawlers, a category of bot, aim
at automating the collection of publicly available Web data.
While some crawlers collect data with the agreement of the
websites being crawled, most crawlers do not respect the terms of
service. CAPTCHAs and approaches based on analyzing series
of HTTP requests classify users as humans or bots. However,
these approaches require either user interaction or a significant
volume of data before they can classify the traffic.
In this paper, we study browser fingerprinting as a crawler de-
tection mechanism. We crawled the Alexa top 10K and identified
291 websites that block crawlers. We show that fingerprinting is
used by 93 (31.96%) of them and we report on the crawler detec-
tion techniques implemented by the major fingerprinters. Finally,
we evaluate the resilience of fingerprinting against crawlers trying
to conceal themselves. We show that although fingerprinting is
good at detecting crawlers, it can be bypassed with little effort
by an adversary with knowledge on the fingerprints collected.
I. INTRODUCTION
A majority of the web’s traffic is due to crawlers [32], [41],
which are programs that explore websites to extract data. While
such crawlers provide benefits to the websites they crawl—e.g.,
by increasing visibility from search engines—other crawlers’
sole intent is to scrape valuable data to provides compet-
itive advantages. Some businesses crawl their competitors’
websites, to adjust their pricing strategy, while others copy,
republish and monetize content without permission. The legal
and moral issues of crawling have been discussed [6], [45],
and companies have sued [12] and won against crawlers [61].
To protect from undesired crawling, most websites host
a robots.txt file that specifies the pages that can be
crawled and indexed. However, there is no mechanism to force
malicious crawlers to respect it. CAPTCHAs [59] are popular
to detect malicious crawlers, but progress in automatic image
and audio recognition, as well as for-profit crowdsourcing
services [49], [1], [10], mean they can be bypassed [7]. Other
techniques rely on analyzing the sequence of requests sent by
the client. Rate limiting techniques [51], [52], [5], [60] analyze
features, such as the number of requests or pages loaded, to
classify the client as human or crawler, while more advanced
techniques extract features from time series [33].
Browser fingerprinting is a less studied approach to detect
crawlers. Fingerprints are attributes that characterize a user’s
device and browser. While fingerprinting has been studied for
tracking [20], [58], [43], [2], [22], [36], [42], it has received
less attention for security purposes [9], [3], [44], [54]. Browser
fingerprinting addresses some of the weaknesses of state-of-
the-art crawler detection techniques, such as:
• Contrary to CAPTCHAs, fingerprinting does not require
user interaction,
• Contrary to methods based on HTTP requests or time
series, fingerprinting requires a single request to decide
whether a client is a crawler.
This work aims to improve the understanding of browser
fingerprinting for crawler detection. We crawled the Alexa
Top 10K websites to answer the following questions:
A. What ratio of websites have adopted browser fingerprinting
for crawler detection?
B. What are the key detection techniques implemented by
major commercial fingerprinters?
C. How resilient is fingerprinting against adversaries that
alters fingerprints to escape detection?
The contributions of our work are:
1) Adoption of fingerprinting as a crawler detection mecha-
nism is studied in the wild by analyzing the scripts present
on the websites of the Alexa’s Top 10K;
2) Fingerprinting techniques: we deobfuscate the 4 most
common fingerprinting scripts that detect crawlers. We
present the key attributes and how they reveal crawlers;
3) Resilience to adversaries: we create crawlers with dis-
tinct fingerprints to evaluate the resilience of fingerprint-
ing against adversaries that try to evade detection. We
measure the effort required and show that fingerprinting
is good at detecting crawlers that evade state-of-the-art
techniques, but can still be bypassed by knowledgeable
adversaries.
An overview of FP-CRAWLERS, including our contribu-
tions and the paper’s structure, is depicted in Figure 1. In
particular, Section III crawls the Alexa’s Top 10K to find
websites that use fingerprinting to detect crawlers. Section IV
explains the key techniques they use. Section V evaluate the
resilience of fingerprinting against adversarial crawlers.
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Fig. 1: Overview of FP-CRAWLERS.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Crawler & Bot Detection Techniques
Traffic shape analysis. Jacob et al. [33] propose a system to
detect crawlers. Contrary to other approaches that rely on the
concept of user sessions [51], [52], [5], [60], they decompose
time series into a trend, a season and a noise component, and
extract features such as the sample auto-correlated function
(SAC) to characterize traffic stability. Using these features,
the system builds classifiers that vote if a user is a crawler.
While the heuristic based on HTTP headers has an accuracy
of 71.6%, with the time series analysis it increases to 95%.
CAPTCHAs. CAPTCHAs [59] rely on Turing tests to de-
termine if a user is human. While widespread, their main
drawback is that they require user interaction. Moreover, recent
progress in image and audio recognition, as well as crowd-
sourcing services [1], [10] have made it easier to break popular
CAPTCHA services such as Google’s reCAPTCHA [49], [7].
Behavioral biometrics. Chu et al. [11] leverage behavioral
biometrics to detect blog spam bots. Their hypothesis is that
humans need their mouse to navigate and their keyboards
to type. They collect events, such as keystrokes, and train a
decision tree to predict if a user is human.
Other detection techniques. The use of IP address lists of
cloud providers, proxies and VPNs [63], or the timing of
operations to detect browsers in virtual machines [29], can
also be used to indicate crawlers.
B. Browser Fingerprinting for Crawler Detection
While the privacy implications of browser fingerprint-
ing have been broadly studied [20], [58], [43], [2], [22],
[36], [42], [39], its ability to detect crawlers has been less
studied. Recent studies [35], [34] show that websites and
bot detection companies heavily rely on the presence of
attributes added by instrumentation frameworks and head-
less browsers, such as navigator.webdriver, to detect
crawlers. Bursztein et al. [9] rely on canvas fingerprinting [39]
to create dynamic challenges to detect emulated or spoofed
devices used to post fake reviews on the App Store. Contrary
to techniques that uniquely identify a device, they verify the
devices class by drawing geometric shapes and texts that are
expected to render similarly on devices of the same class.
Nikiforakis et al. [43], [2] and Vastel et al. [57] identify
fingerprinting countermeasures, such as user agent spoofers
and canvas countermeasures, due to their side effects. In this
paper we show that fingerprinters exploit similar techniques,
such as non-standard features or inconsistent fingerprints, to
detect crawlers.
C. Other Forms of Fingerprinting
While this paper focuses on browser fingerprinting—i.e.
the application layer—other forms operate at the network and
protocol layers. These forms only identify classes of devices
or clients, but are not immune to spoofing [50], [24]. TCP
fingerprinting relies on the IPv4, IPv6 and TCP headers to
identify the OS and software sending a request [4]. The
TLS protocol can be used to fingerprint a client [8] due to
differences in the sets of cipher suites and elliptic curves in
the client’s TLS implementation.
III. DETECTING CRAWLER BLOCKING AND
FINGERPRINTING WEBSITES
In this section we describe our experimental protocol to
classify websites that use browser fingerprinting to detect and
block crawlers. This protocol is composed of two main steps:
A. Detecting websites that block crawlers. From Alexa’s
Top 10K, we identify websites that block crawlers. These
websites provide an oracle that we use to evaluate the
resilience of browser fingerprinting in Section V;
B. Detecting websites that use fingerprinting. Among web-
sites that block crawlers, we detect those that use finger-
printing to do so (and we break down their techniques in
Section IV).
A. Detecting Websites that Block Crawlers
By combining multiple crawlers, we analyze all the web-
sites from Alexa’s Top 10K that block crawlers based on the
user agent.
Crawler 1: Obvious to detect. The crawler visits each
homepage of Alexa Top 10k websites, and up to 4 random
links belonging to the same domain. We only crawl 4 links to
isolate fingerprinting from traffic analysis. A page is loaded
when there are two active network connections or less for
500ms (networkidle2 event of the Puppeteer library). If
the page is not loaded after 30 seconds, we add it to a failed
queue that is retried at the end of the crawl. When a page is
loaded, the crawler waits for 3 seconds, dumps the HTML, and
takes a screenshot. Crawler 1 is based on Chromium headless,
instrumented using Puppeteer [27]. We do not modify the
user agent, Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac
OS X 10_14_2) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) HeadlessChrome/72.0.3582.0
Safari/537.36, thus clearly exposing it to detection
techniques. Although the decision to block might be based on
other attributes, it still indicates the way the website reacts
to crawlers. Because Headless Chrome is very popular for
crawling and has replaced older headless browsers, such as
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PhantomJS, we consider it unlikely that websites that block
crawlers do not attempt to detect Chrome headless. Moreover,
its user agent has been added to popular lists used for crawler
detection [38]. We also make the hypothesis that websites
that try to block bots using more complex techniques, such
as traffic shape analysis, are likely to use crawler blacklists.
Indeed, these lists have no false positives and can block
crawlers before they load a page.
Crawler 2: Checking detection occurrences. On another
machine that runs in parallel, with a different IP address,
crawler 2, with a user agent modified to a vanilla Chrome
browser, visits the homepages of the Alexa Top 10K. This
crawl serves to verify the results of crawler 1 and, in particular,
the pages reporting errors as websites might fake an error to
block the previous crawler. The HTML is also dumped and a
screenshot taken.
Labeling screenshots of suspicious websites. To label web-
sites as blocking crawlers or not, we developed a web interface
that displays the screenshots for each URL taken by crawlers
1 and 2, side-by-side. Each is assigned 1 out of 3 possible
labels:
1) ”not blocked”: the crawler has not been blocked if the
page does not show any signs of blocking, such as an
explicit message or a CAPTCHA;
2) ”blocked”: the crawler has been blocked if the page
reports an obvious block, such as a CAPTCHA or a
message indicating that we are blocked. If an error from
crawler 1 indicates that the page is not available or the
website is down, but not from crawler 2, we consider it
blocked and not an error;
3) ”unknown”: corresponds to cases where we cannot assess
with certainty the crawler has been blocked. This situation
can occur because the page timed-out. In cases where
both crawlers 1 and 2 report a 403 error, we manually
verify the website. To do so, we visit the website using a
computer with a residential IP address that has not been
used for crawls. If it still returns a 403 error, we classify
the URL as ”unknown”, as it blocks all users, not only
crawlers. Otherwise, the URL is classified as ”blocked”.
B. Detecting Websites that use Fingerprinting
In the second phase, we focus on the websites we labeled as
”blocked”. We crawl these websites to classify them as either
using fingerprinting for crawler detection or not.
Crawler modifications. We apply two modifications to the
crawler’s fingerprint to escape detection based on HTTP
headers. First, we modify the user agent to look like a
user agent from a vanilla Chrome. Second, we add an
accept-language header field as it is not sent by Headless
Chrome [26].
The crawler visits each home page of the websites iden-
tified as blocking crawlers and, for each, visits up to 3
randomly selected links on the same domain. We only visit
3 links as the goal is to detect websites using fingerprinting
on popular pages that can easily be reached. It does not aim
to detect fingerprinting on more sensitive pages, such as login
or payment pages. We use the same heuristics to check if
a page is loaded. If the page fails, it is added to a queue
of URLs that are retried. For each URL, the crawler records
the attributes commonly accessed in the browser fingerprinting
literature [2], [25], [22]. To record the accesses, we inject a
JavaScript snippet to override the default behaviors of getters
and functions to store, for each script of the page, when it
accesses them. We override the properties of the navigator
and the screen objects; functions related to canvas, audio,
and WebGL fingerprinting; and access to attributes used by
security fingerprinting scripts, such as window._phantom
or navigator.webdriver, which are known to belong to
crawlers. We explain the roles of these attributes in more detail
in the next subsection. A complete list of the attributes and
functions monitored is available in Appendix A. Finally, we
consider a website to use fingerprinting for crawler detection
if:
1) at least one script called one or more functions related to
canvas, WebGL, audio or WebRTC fingerprinting;
2) the script also tries to access one crawler-
related attribute, such as window._phantom or
navigator.webdriver; and
3) the script also retrieves at least 12 fingerprinting attributes.
We adopt this definition as there is no clear agreement on
how to characterize fingerprinting, in particular when used for
crawler detection. For example, Acar et al. [2] consider font
enumeration as a good indicator. However, as we show in the
next section, font enumeration is not the most discriminant
feature for crawler detection. Our definition rather ensures
that a script accesses a sufficient number of fingerprinting at-
tributes, in particular attributes considered strong indicators of
fingerprinting, such as canvas. As we study crawler detection,
we add a constraint to check that the script accesses at least
one crawler-related attribute, given that these are widely known
and show intent to block crawlers [21].
IV. ANALYZING FINGERPRINTING SCRIPTS
We answer RQ 1 by showing that fingerprinting is widely
used among websites that block crawlers, and RQ 2 by pre-
senting the techniques implemented by the main fingerprinters
present on the Alexa Top 10K.
A. Describing our Experimental Dataset
All crawls were conducted in December 2018.
Sites blocking crawlers. Among the 10,000 websites we
crawled, we identified 291 websites that block crawlers
(2.91%). The median Alexa rank of websites blocking crawlers
is 4, 946, against 5, 001 for websites that do not. Thus, there
is no significant difference in the distribution of the rank of
websites that block crawlers and websites that do not.
Fingerprinting attributes. For each website that blocks
crawlers, we study the number of fingerprinting attributes
they access. For a given website, we look at the script
that accesses the maximum number of distinct fingerprinting
attributes. The median number of distinct fingerprinting at-
tributes accessed is 12, while 10% of the websites access
more than 33. Concerning crawler-specific attributes (e.g.,
navigator.webdriver, window._phantom), 51.38%
of the websites do not access any, while 10% access 10.
Based on our definition of browser fingerprinting, we found 93
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that use fingerprinting for crawler detection, which represents
31.96% of the websites that block crawlers (RQ 1).
Diversity of fingerprinting scripts. We group fingerprinting
scripts by the combination of attributes they access. In total, we
observe 20 distinct groups among websites blocking crawlers.
While groups may contain essentially the same script from
the same company on different sites, we also observe that
some companies are present in different clusters because of
multiple versions of their script. We focus on the scripts from
4 fingerprinting companies as they represent more than 90 %
of the scripts among the websites that block crawlers. Since
they have multiple versions of their script, we chose the script
that accesses the greatest distinct number of fingerprinting
attributes. We decided not to disclose the names of these
companies since it does not contribute to the understanding
of fingerprinting and our findings could be used by crawler
developers to specifically target some websites.
In the remainder of this section, we report on the techniques
used by the 4 main fingerprinting scripts to detect crawlers.
These scripts collect fingerprinting attributes and either per-
form a detection test directly in the browser or transmit the
fingerprints to a server to perform the detection test. Table I
provides an overview of the attributes and tests. For each
attribute and script, there are three possible values:
1) X indicates that the script collects the attribute and tests
it in the browser—i.e. its value is explicitly verified or
we know the attribute is used for the detection because
of the evaluation conducted in Section V;
2) ∼ indicates that the script collects the attribute, but no test
is run directly in the script. This means the value collected
may be used server-side. The empirical evaluation we
conduct in Section V help us to understand if some
attributes are used server-side;
3) The absence of symbol indicates that the attribute is not
collected by the script.
The 4 scripts we analyze are obfuscated and we cannot
use variable or function names to infer their purposes. Instead,
we use access to open source fingerprinting libraries [55], the
state-of-the-art literature, as well as an empirical evaluation we
conducted in Section V to explain how the attributes are used.
B. Detecting Crawler-Specific Attributes
The first detection technique in the 4 scripts relies on
the presence of attributes injected into the JavaScript exe-
cution context or the HTML DOM by headless browsers
or instrumenting frameworks. For example, in the case
of CHROME or FIREFOX, we can detect an automated
browser if the navigator.webdriver attribute is set
to true. The scripts also test for the presence of prop-
erties added to the document object by SELENIUM,
such as: 1) __fxdriver _unwrapped, 2) __selenium
_unwrapped, and 3) __webdriver_script_fn. Be-
sides SELENIUM, the scripts also detect headless browsers and
automation libraries, such PHANTOMJS by checking for the
presence of _phantom, callPhantom and phantom in
the window object.
While the presence of any of these attributes provides
a straightforward heuristic to detect crawlers with certainty,
TABLE I: Fingerprinting tests and the scripts that use them.
A X indicates the attribute is collected and a verification test
is run in the script. A ∼ indicates the attribute is collected but
no tests are run directly in the script.
Scripts
Name of the test 1 2 3 4






productSub ∼ ∼ ∼ X
eval.toString() X X
Error properties X X
Browser-specific/prefixed APIs X X X X
Basic features X X X
Different feature behaviour X
Codecs supported X
HTTP headers ∼ X ∼ X
O
S
Touch screen support ∼ ∼ ∼ X
Oscpu and platform ∼ ∼ ∼ X
WebGL vendor and renderer ∼ ∼ ∼
List of plugins ∼ ∼ ∼ X
List of fonts ∼ ∼
Screen dimensions X ∼ ∼ X








Canvas fingerprint ∼ ∼ ∼
WebGL fingerprint ∼ ∼
these attributes can be easily removed to escape detection.
Thus, we investigate more robust detection techniques, based
on fingerprint inconsistencies, to overcome this limitation.
We structure the inconsistencies searched by fingerprinters
into four categories and we present a fifth of common non-
fingerprinting tests found in the scripts: 1) browser and version
inconsistencies, 2) OS inconsistencies, 3) screen inconsisten-
cies, 4) overridden functions inconsistencies, and 5) other tests.
C. Checking Browser Inconsistencies
The first set of verifications found across the 4 scripts aim
at verifying if the user agent has been altered. Before we
present the tests, we provide a brief overview of inconsistencies
and how they reveal crawlers.
Fingerprint inconsistencies can be defined as combinations
of fingerprint attributes that cannot be found in the wild.
They have been studied in the literature [43], [57] to reveal
fingerprinting countermeasures, such as user agent spoofers or
anti-canvas fingerprinting extensions. Fingerprinters also use
inconsistencies to detect combinations of attributes that cannot
be found for non-automated browsers.
1) Explicit browser consistency tests: One script
implements some tests similar to the function
getHasLiedBrowser proposed by FINGERPRINTJS2 [55]:
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productSub. It first extracts the browser from
the user agent and verifies if it has a consistent
navigator.productSub value. While originally it
held the build number of the browser, it now always re-
turns 20030107 on Chromium-based or Safari browsers,
and 20100101 on Firefox;
eval.toString. Then, it runs eval.toString()
.length, which returns the length of the string rep-
resentation of the native eval function. On Safari and
Firefox it is equal to 37, on Internet Explorer it is 39,
and on Chromium-based browsers it is 33;
Error properties. It throws an exception and catches
it to analyze the properties of the error. While some of
the properties of the Error objects, such as message
and name are standard across different browsers, others,
such as toSource, exist only in Firefox. Thus, the script
verifies that if the toSource property is present in the
error, then the browser is Firefox.
2) Feature Detection: We present how different features
tested across the 4 fingerprinting scripts can be used to reveal
inconsistencies in the nature of the browser and its versions,
even when the tests are executed server-side.
Browser-specific APIs. It is possible to test for features
specific to certain browsers [40]. All the scripts test for
the presence of the window.chrome object, a utility for
extension developers available in Chromium-based browsers,
which can also help to reveal Chrome headless. One script tests
for the pushNotification function in window.safari
to verify a Safari browser, the presence of window.opera
for Opera, for Firefox it verifies if the InstallTrigger
variable is defined, and for Internet Explorer it checks the value
returned by eval("/*@cc_on!@*/false"), which relies
on conditional compilation, a feature available in old versions
of Internet Explorer. Another script tests the presence of
features whose names are vendor dependent. For example, it
verifies that the function requestAnimationFrame
is present with msRequestAnimationFrame or
webkitRequestAnimationFrame.
Basic features. Two scripts verify the presence of the bind
function. While this test does not help in detecting recent
headless browsers, it is used to detect PhantomJS [48] as it
did not have this function. Another script collects the first 100
properties of the window object, returned by Object.keys,
to verify their consistency with the user agent. Finally, one of
the scripts tests a set of 18 basic features, such as creating
or removing event listeners using addEventListener and
removeEventListener. It also tests other APIs that have
been available in mainstream browsers for a long time, such
as Int8Array [17], which have been included since Internet
Explorer 10, or the MutationObserver [15] API, available
since Internet Explorer 11. Since, the majority of these features
are present in all recent versions of mainstream browsers, they
can be used to detect non-standard or headless browsers that
do not implement them.
Different feature behaviors. Even when a feature is present,
its behavior may vary. For example, Vastel [56] showed that
Chrome Headless fails to handle permissions [19] consistently.
When requesting permissions using two techniques, Chrome
Headless returns conflicting values, as verified by one of the
scripts.
TABLE II: Support of audio codecs for the main browsers.
Audio codec Chrome Firefox Safari
ogg vorbis probably probably ""
mp3 probably maybe maybe
wav probably maybe maybe
m4a maybe maybe maybe
aac probably maybe maybe
Another feature whose behavior depends on the browser is
the image error placeholder. When an image cannot be loaded,
the browser shows a placeholder whose size depends on the
browser. On Chromium-based browsers it is 16x16 pixels and
does not depend on the zoom level, while on Safari it is 20x20
pixels and depends on the zoom level. In early versions of
Chrome headless, there was no placeholder [56], making them
detectable when the placeholders are a size of 0 pixels. One
of the scripts detects this by creating an image whose src
attribute points to a non existing URL.
3) Audio & Video Codecs: One of the scripts tests the
presence of different audio and video codecs. To do so, it
creates an audio and a video element on which it applies the
canPlayType method to test the availability of audio and
video codecs. The canPlayType function returns 3 possible
values:
1) "probably", which means that the media type appears
to be playable,
2) "maybe" indicates that it is not possible to tell if the
type can be played without playing it,
3) "", an empty string indicating that the type cannot be
played.
Table II reports on the audio codecs supported by vanilla
browsers. It is based on the dataset from Caniuse [16], [14],
[18], [13], as well as data collected on the personal website
of one of the authors of this paper. We can observe that some
codecs are not supported by all browsers, which means that
they can be used to check the browser claimed in the user
agent.
4) HTTP headers: Contrary to JavaScript features, which
are collected in the browser, HTTP headers are collected on the
server side. Thus, we cannot directly observe if fingerprinters
collect these headers. Nevertheless, because of side-effects,
such as being blocked, we observe that all fingerprinters
collect at least the user agent header. Moreover, we also
detect that 2 of the fingerprinters test for the presence of
the accept-language header. Indeed, by default, Chrome
headless does not send this header. In the evaluation, we show
that its absence enables some of the fingerprinters to block
crawlers based on Chrome headless.
D. Checking OS Inconsistencies
Only one script among the four performs an explicit OS
verification. Nevertheless, it does not mean that others do not
conduct such tests on the server side using attributes collected
by the fingerprinting script or using other techniques, such as
TCP fingerprinting [62].
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Explicit OS consistency tests. The set of tests conducted
by the only fingerprinter that verifies the OS in its script
is similar to the getHasLiedOs function of the library
FingerprintJS2 [55]. It extracts the OS claimed in the user
agent to use it as a reference and then runs the following set
of tests:
1) Touch screen verification. It tests if the device sup-
ports touch screen by verifying the following properties:
the presence of the ontouchstart property in the
object window and navigator.maxTouchPoints
or navigator.msMaxTouchPoints are greater than
0. If the device claims to have touch support, then it
should be running one of the following operating systems:
Windows Phone, Android or iOS.
2) Oscpu and platform. Oscpu is an attribute, only avail-
able on Firefox, that returns a string representing the
platform on which the browser is executing. The script
verifies that the OS claimed in the user agent is consistent
with the navigator.oscpu attribute. For example, if
a platform attribute indicates that the device is running on
arm, then the OS should be Android or Linux. They also
conduct similar tests with the navigator.platform
attribute.
Only one fingerprinter runs the above set of tests directly
in its script. Nevertheless, the other three fingerprinting scripts
also collect information about the presence of a touch screen,
navigator.platform and navigator.oscpu. Thus,
they may run similar verifications on the server side.
WebGL information. Three of the scripts use the WebGL API
to collect information about the vendor and the renderer of the
graphic drivers. These values are linked to the OS and can be
used to verify OS consistency [57]. For example, a renderer
containing "Adreno" indicates the presence of an Android
device, while a renderer containing "Iris OpenGL" reveals
the presence of MacOS. One of the scripts also verifies if
the renderer is equal to "Mesa OffScreen", which is
one of the values returned by the first versions of Headless
Chrome [53], [56].
List of plugins. The four scripts collect the list of plugins
using the navigator.plugins property. While some of
the plugins are browser dependent and can be used to verify the
claimed browser, they can also be used to verify the OS [57].
List of fonts. Two of the fingerprinting scripts collect a list
of fonts using JavaScript font enumeration [43]. While it can
be used to increase the uniqueness of the fingerprint [23], it
can also be used to reveal the underlying OS [46], [57] since
some fonts are only found on specific OSes by default.
E. Checking Screen Inconsistencies
The four scripts collect information related to the
screen and window sizes. In particular, they all collect the
following attributes: screen.width/ height, screen.
availWidth/ Height, window. innerWidth/
Height, window. outerWidth/ Height and
window. devicePixelRatio.
For example, the screen. width and screen.
height represent the width and the height of the web-
exposed screen, respectively. The screen.availWidth
and screen.availHeight attributes represent the hori-
zontal and vertical space in pixels available to the window,
respectively. Thus, one of the scripts verifies that the available
height and width are always less than (in case there is a
desktop toolbar) or equal to the height and the width. Another
property used to detect some headless browsers is the fact that,
by definition, window.outerHeight/Width should be
greater than window.innerHeight/Width. Nevertheless,
one should be careful when using this test since it does not
hold on iOS devices [30] where the outerHeight is always
equal to 0.
Overriden Inconsistencies. Crawler developers may be aware
of the detection techniques presented in this section and try to
hide such inconsistencies by forging the expected responses—
i.e., providing a fingerprint that could come from a vanilla
browser, and thus not be detected as a crawler. To do so, one
solution is to intercept the outgoing requests containing the
fingerprint to modify them on the fly, however, this cannot
always be easily done when scripts are carefully obfuscated
and randomized. Another solution is to use JavaScript to
override the functions and getters used to collect the fin-
gerprint attributes. However, when doing this, the developer
should be careful to hide the fact she is overriding native
functions and attributes. If not, checking the string represen-
tation of the functions will reveal that a native function has
been intentionally overridden. While a standard execution of
functionName.toString() returns a string containing
native code in the case of a native function, it returns
the code of the new function if it has been overridden. Thus,
we observe that all the scripts check fingerprinting functions,
such as getImageData used to obtain a canvas value or the
WebRTC class constructor, have been overridden.
Detection using side effects. Besides looking at the string
representation of native functions and objects, one script goes
further by verifying the value returned by a native function. It
verifies that the getImageData function used to collect the
value of a canvas has been overridden by looking at the value
of specific pixels.
F. Other Non-fingerprinting Attributes
Events. Crawlers may programmatically generate fake mouse
movements to fool behavioral analysis detection systems. To
detect such events, two of the fingerprinting scripts check that
events originate from human actions. If an event has been
generated programmatically, the browser sets its isTrusted
property to false. Nevertheless, this approach does not
help in detecting crawlers automated using Selenium or the
Chrome DevTools protocol, since the events they generate are
considered trusted by the browser.
Crawler trap. One script creates a crawler trap using an
invisible link with the "nofollow" property and appends
a unique random identifier to the URL pointed to by the link.
Thus, if a user loads the URL, it can be identified as a crawler
that does not respect the nofollow policy.
Red pill. One script collects a red pill similar to the one
presented by Ho et al. [29] to test if a browser is running
in a virtual machine or an emulated device. The red pill
exploits performance differences caused by caching and virtual
hardware.
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In this section, we showed that 291 sites from the Alexa
Top 10K block crawlers using the user agent. Among these,
93 websites (31.96%) use fingerprinting for crawler detection.
They use different techniques that leverage attributes added
by automated browsers or fingerprint inconsistencies to detect
crawlers.
V. DETECTING CRAWLER FINGERPRINTS
In this section, we first evaluate the effectiveness of browser
fingerprinting to detect crawlers. Then, we answer RQ 3
by studying the resilience of browser fingerprinting against
an adversary browser who alters its fingerprint to escape
detection.
A. Experimental Protocol
Ground truth challenge. The main challenge to evaluate
crawler detection approaches is to obtain ground truth labels
to assess the evaluation. The typical approach to obtain labels
is to request experts from the field to check raw data, such as
fingerprints and HTTP logs, and use their knowledge to label
these samples. The main problem of this approach is that labels
assigned by the experts are as good as the current knowledge
of the experts labeling the data. Similarly to machine learning
models that struggle to generalize to new data, these experts
may be good at labeling old crawlers they have already
encountered, but not at labeling new kinds of crawlers they
are unaware of, which may artificially increase or decrease the
performance of the approach evaluated. To address this issue,
we decide to exercise a family of crawlers on websites that
have been identified as blocking crawlers. Thus, no matter how
the crawler tries to alter its fingerprint, we can always assert
that it is a crawler because it is under our control. Then, in
order to measure the effectiveness of fingerprinting for crawler
detection, we rely on the fact that the crawled websites have
been identified as websites that block crawlers. We consider
that, whenever they detect a crawler, they will block it. We
use this blocking information as an oracle for the evaluation.
A solution to obtain the ground truth would have been to
subscribe to the different bot detection services. Nevertheless,
besides the significant cost, bot detection companies tend to
verify the identity of their customers to ensure it is not used by
competitors trying to reverse engineer their solution or by bot
creators trying to obtain an oracle to maximize their ad-fraud
incomes for example.
1) Crawler Family: In order to evaluate the resilience of
fingerprinting, we send 7 different crawlers that incrementally
modify their fingerprints to become increasingly more difficult
to detect. Table III presents the crawlers and the attributes they
modify. The first six crawlers are based on Chrome headless
for the following reasons:
1) It has become a popular headless browser for crawl-
ing. Since its first release, the once popular PhantomJS
stopped being maintained [28];
2) It implements the majority of features present in popular
non-headless browsers, making therefore its detection
more challenging compare to older headless browsers;
3) Older headless browsers, such as PhantomJS (not main-
tained since March 2018) and SlimerJS (works only with
Firefox version < 59 released in 2017), would have
TABLE III: List of crawlers and altered attributes.
Crawler Attributes modified
Chrome headless based
Crawler 1 User agent
Crawler 2 Crawler 1 + webdriver
Crawler 3 Crawler 2 + accept-language
Crawler 4 Crawler 3 + window.chrome
Crawler 5 Crawler 4 + permissions
Crawler 6 Crawler 5 + screen resolution +codecs + touch screen
Vanilla Chrome based
Crawler 7 webdriver
been easily detected because of the lack of modern web
features [48].
The last crawler is based on a vanilla Chrome browser.
We use this crawler to better understand why blocking oc-
curs, and to assess that crawlers are blocked because of
their fingerprint. Indeed, since this crawler is based on a
vanilla Chrome, the only difference in its fingerprint is the
navigator.webdriver attribute. Once this attribute is
removed, it can no longer be detected through fingerprinting.
We restrict the evaluation to 7 different crawlers. Ide-
ally, a perfect protocol would randomly mutate fingerprint
attributes to provide a fine-grained understanding. However,
this was not feasible in practice, as our evaluation requires
residential IP addresses of which we have a limited supply,
as well as the exponential complexity resulting from testing
all attribute permutations on the set of evaluated websites.
While we could have used residential proxy services to acquire
more residential IP addresses, this approach still has several
drawbacks. Mi et al. [37] showed that a majority of the
devices proposed by residential proxy services did not give
their consent. Moreover, since residential proxy services do
not provide mechanisms to ensure the nature of the device
that will act as a proxy, there can be inconsistencies between
the browser fingerprint of our crawlers and the TCP or TLS
fingerprints of the proxy, making it more difficult to understand
why a crawler was blocked.
Details of the modified attributes. Crawlers 2 to 6 build
on the previous one, adding new modifications each time to
increase the difficulty of detection. For example, crawler 4
implements the changes made by crawlers 1, 2 and 3.
1) Crawler 1 is based on Headless Chrome with a modified
user agent to look like a vanilla Chrome user agent;
2) In the case of Crawler 2, we delete the navigator.
webdriver property;
3) By default, Chrome headless does not add an
accept-language header to its requests. Thus, for
Crawler 3, we add this header whose value is set to
"en-US";
4) Crawler 4 injects a chrome property to the window
object;
5) For Crawler 5, we override the management of the
permissions for the notifications to hide the incon-
sistency exposed by Headless Chrome [56]. Since
we override the behavior of native functions, we
also override their toString method, as well as
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Function.prototype.toString—i.e., in order to
hide our changes;
6) For Crawler 6, we apply modifications related to the
size of the screen, the availability of touch support
and the codecs supported by the browser. First, we
override the following properties of the window ob-
ject: innerWidth/Height, outerWidth/Height
and window.screenX/Y. We also modify properties
of the screen object: availWidth/Height and
width/height. By default, Chrome headless simulates
touch screen support even when Chrome headless is
running on a device that does not support it. To emulate a
desktop computer without touch support, we override the
document.createEvent function so that it throws
an exception when trying to create a TouchEvent.
We also override navigator.maxTouchPoints to
return 0 and we delete the ontouchstart property
of the window object. We also lie about the codecs
supported to return the same value as a vanilla Chrome.
In order to hide changes made to native functions, we
override their toString;
7) Contrary to the first six crawlers, Crawler 7 is based
on a vanilla Chrome—i.e., non-headless. Thus, we only
remove the webdriver attribute from the navigator
object.
2) Evaluation Dataset: We present how we select websites
used for the evaluation.
Cross-domain detection. Since we want to evaluate fin-
gerprinting for crawler detection, we try to eliminate other
detection factors that could interfere with our evaluation. One
such factor is cross-domain detection. This occurs when a
company provides a crawler detection service that is present
on multiple domains being crawled. In this situation, the
company can leverage metrics collected on different domains,
such as the number of requests, to classify traffic no matter
the website. In order to minimize the risk that cross-domain
detection interferes with our evaluation, we need to decrease
the number of websites that belong to the same company in
the evaluation dataset. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the
number of websites in the evaluation dataset and the capacity to
eliminate other factors, such as cross-domain detection. While,
to our knowledge, no research has been published on cross-
domain detection, we encountered this phenomenon during
the different crawls we conducted. Moreover, during informal
discussions with a crawler detection company, engineers also
mentioned this practice.
Selection of websites. We group websites identified as block-
ing crawlers and using fingerprinting (as defined in Section III)
based on the combination of fingerprinting attributes they
access. We obtain 20 groups of fingerprinting scripts and, for
each of the groups, we randomly select one website. Even
though it does not totally eliminate cross-domain detection
since, as shown in Section IV, fingerprinters can have different
scripts, it still enables to evaluate all the different fingerprint-
ing scripts present in the dataset. Then, we randomly select
20 websites that block crawlers without using fingerprinting
to compare fingerprinting-based detection against other ap-
proaches.
Crawling protocol. For each of the 7 crawlers, we run 5
crawls on the previously selected websites. Each crawl is run
from a machine with a residential or university IP address that
has not been used for crawling for at least 2 days to limit
the influence of IP reputation. Studying how IP reputation
influences detection is left as future work. A crawl consists
of the following steps:
a) We randomly shuffle the order of the websites in the
evaluation dataset. It enables to minimize and measure
the side effects that can occur because of cross-domain
detection;
b) For each website, the crawler visits the home page and
then visits up to 10 randomly-selected pages from the same
domain. As explained later in this section, we crawl only 10
links to ensure that we evaluate the effectiveness of browser
fingerprinting detection and not the effectiveness of other
state-of-the-art detection approaches;
c) Once a page is loaded, the crawler takes a screenshot and
stores the HTML of the page for further analysis;
d) Between two consecutive crawled pages, the crawler waits
for 15 seconds plus a random time between 1 and 5 seconds.
3) Crawler behaviors: In the previous subsection, we ex-
plain how we select websites in a way that minimizes cross-
domain detection. Here, we present how we adapt the behavior
of the 7 crawlers so that other approaches, such as rate limiting
techniques or behavioral analysis, do not interfere with our
evaluation. Thus, the crawlers should not be detected by state-
of-the-art techniques presented in Section II that rely on the
following features: 1) Number of HTTP requests, 2) Number of
bytes requested from the server, 3) Number and percentage of
HTML requests, 4) Percentage of PDF requests, 5) Percentage
of image requests, 6) Duration of a session, 7) Percentage
of 4xx error requests, 8) ROBOTS.TXT file request, 9) Page
popularity index, and 10) Hidden links.
To address points (1) to (6), crawlers request few pages
so that it looks like the requests originate from a human.
Moreover, we do not block any resources, such as images or
PDFs, nor do we ask for these resources in particular. The
crawlers visit only up to 10 pages for a given website. Since
the attributes used in fingerprinting are constant on short time
periods, such as a crawling session, a fingerprinter does not
need multiple pages to detect if a fingerprint belongs to a
crawler, which means that this criterion should not affect our
evaluation. Moreover, the navigation delay between 2 pages is
15 seconds plus a random delay between 1 and 5 seconds. We
chose a mean value of 15 seconds since it has been observed
that a majority of users do not stay more than 15 seconds on
a page on average [31]. We add some randomness so that if
a website measures the time between two requested pages, it
does not look deterministic. Points (7) and (9) are addressed
by only following internal links exposed from the home page
or pages directly linked by the home page, which is more
likely to point to both popular and existing pages. To address
point (8), the crawlers never request the Robots.txt file,
which means that we do not take into account the policy of
the website concerning crawlers. Nevertheless, since we crawl
only a few pages, it should have little impact.
B. Experimental Results
1) Presentation of the dataset: In total, we crawl 40
different websites, randomly selected from the list of websites
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Fig. 2: Crawl efficiency statistics.
blocking crawlers between December 2018 and January 2019.
22 of them use browser fingerprinting and 18 do not use
fingerprinting. Initially, we selected two equal sets of 20
websites using and not using fingerprinting. Nevertheless, we
noticed that 2 of the websites had been misclassified. We did
not detect fingerprinting on these websites but we observed the
side-effects of cross-domains fingerprinters. Since the crawler
used for fingerprinting detection had been detected on some
other websites, its IP address was blacklisted. Thus, when
the crawler visited other websites with the fingerprinter that
blocked it earlier, it was blocked at the first request because
of its IP address, without having the possibility to load and
execute the JavaScript present on the page. In total, we run 35
crawls—i.e., 5 per crawler—each with a residential IP address
that has not been used for at least two days for crawling.
2) Blocking results: Figure 2 reports on the results of the
crawls for the 7 crawlers. The results have been obtained by
labeling the data using the same web interface as the one we
used in Section III. For each crawler, we present the average
number of times per crawl it is blocked by websites that use
fingerprinting and websites that do not use fingerprinting.
Influence of fingerprint modifications. We see that the more
changes are applied to the crawler’s fingerprint, the less it gets
blocked. While Crawler 1 gets blocked 11.8 times on average,
the detection falls to 1.0 time for Crawler 6 that applies more
extensive modifications to its fingerprint. We also observe an
important decrease in the number of times crawlers are blocked
between crawlers 1 and 2. It goes from 11.8 for Crawler 1
to 3.6 for Crawler 2. The only difference being the removal
of the webdriver attribute from the navigator object,
which means that fingerprinters heavily rely on this attribute
to detect crawlers.
Blocking speed. We also analyze the speed at which crawlers
get blocked—i.e., after how many pages crawled on a given
website a crawler is blocked. Except for Crawler 5 that gets
blocked after 3.1 pages crawled on average, crawlers are
blocked before crawling 3 pages of a website, on average.
Fingerprinters detect more crawlers. We also observe that,
on average, websites using fingerprinting block more crawlers
than websites without fingerprinting. For example, on average,
93.2% (11.0) of websites blocking Crawler 1 use fingerprint-
ing. The only exception is Crawler 7, where 75% of the time it
gets blocked, it is by a website not using fingerprinting. This
is the expected result since Crawler 7 is based on a vanilla
Chrome, which means that its fingerprint is not different from
the one of a standard browser.
Analysis of other detection factors. The fact that Crawler 7
still gets blocked despite the fact it has a normal fingerprint
raises the question of other detection factors used in addition to
fingerprinting. Even though we take care to adapt the behavior
of the crawlers to minimize the chance they get detected by
other techniques, we cannot exclude that it occurs. Thus, we
verify if crawlers are detected because of their fingerprint or
because of other state-of-the-art detection techniques.
First, we investigate if some of the crawlers have been
blocked because of cross-domain detection. To do so, we
manually label, for each fingerprinting script in the evaluation
dataset, the company it belongs to. Whenever we cannot iden-
tify the company, we assign a random identifier. We identify 4
fingerprinters present on more than 2 websites in the evaluation
dataset and that could use their presence on multiple domains
to do cross-domain detection. We focus only on websites that
blocked Crawlers 4, 5 and 6. Indeed, only one fingerprinting
company succeeds to detect Crawlers 4, 5 and 6. Thus, we
argue that Crawlers 1, 2 and 3 detected by websites using
fingerprinting, are indeed detected because of their fingerprint.
If their detection had relied on other techniques, then some
of the Crawlers 4, 5, 6 and 7 would have also been blocked
by these websites. Moreover, the analysis of the fingerprinting
scripts we conduct in Section IV shows that some of these
fingerprinters have the information needed to detect Crawlers 1,
2 and 3, but not to detect more advanced crawlers using
fingerprinting.
We analyze in more details the only fingerprinter that
detected Crawlers 4, 5 and 6. At each crawl, the order of
the websites is randomized. Thus, for each crawler and each
crawl, we extract the rank of each of the websites that have
a fingerprinting script from this company. Then, we test if the
order in which websites from this fingerprinter are crawled
impact the chance of a crawler to be detected. Nevertheless, we
observe that crawlers get blocked on websites independently
of their rank.
Non-stable blocking behavior. We also notice that websites
that use the fingerprinting scripts provided by the only fin-
gerprinter that blocked crawlers 4, 5 and 6 do not all behave
the same way. Indeed, depending on the website, some of the
advanced crawlers have never been blocked. It can occur for
several reasons: 1) The websites have different versions of the
scripts that collect different attributes; 2) On its website, the
fingerprinter proposes different service plans. While some of
them are oriented towards blocking crawlers, others only aim
at detecting crawlers to improve the quality of the analytics
data.
Even on the same website, the blocking behavior is not
always stable over time. Indeed, some of the websites do not
always block a given crawler. Moreover, some of the websites
able to block advanced crawlers do not block crawlers easier
to detect. For example, the only website that is able to block
both crawlers 5 and 6, only blocked 13 times over the 35 crawls
made by all the crawlers. It means that 37.1% of the time, this
website did not block crawlers, even though it could have done
9
so. In particular, this website never blocked Crawlers 1 and 2
even though they are easier to detect than Crawlers 5 and 6.
Undetected crawlers. We also observe that some websites
could have detected Crawlers 3 and 4 using the information
they collected. Indeed, these websites verify the consistency of
the notification permission, which as we show in Section IV,
enables to detect crawlers based on Chrome headless. A
possible explanation to why the fingerprinter present on these
websites was blocking Crawlers 1, 2, but not Crawlers 3 and
4 is because the first two crawlers can be detected solely
using information contained in the HTTP headers (lack of
accept-language header). However, Crawlers 3 and 4
require information collected in the browser, which may be
handled differently by the fingerprinter.
In this section, we showed that fingerprinting helps to
detect more crawlers than non-fingerprinting techniques. For
example, 93.2% (11 websites) of the websites that have de-
tected crawler 1 use fingerprinting. Nevertheless, the important
decrease in the average number of times crawlers are blocked
between crawlers 1 and 2, from 11.8 websites to 3.6, indicates
that websites rely on simple features such as the presence of
the webdriver attribute to block crawlers. Finally, we show
that only 2.5% of the websites detect crawler 6 that applied
heavier modifications to its fingerprint to escape the detection,
which shows one of the main flaws of fingerprinting for crawler
detection: its lack of resilience against adversarial crawlers.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Limits of Browser Fingerprinting
The analysis of the major fingerprinting scripts shows
that it is heavily used to detect older generations of head-
less browsers or automation frameworks. These browsers and
frameworks used to be easily identifiable because of the
attributes they injected in the window or document objects.
In addition to these attributes, older headless browsers lacked
basic features that were present by default in mainstream
browsers, making them easily detectable using feature de-
tection. Since 2017, Chrome headless has proposed a more
realistic headless browser that implements most of the features
available in a vanilla Chrome. Even though we show that
fingerprinters use differences between vanilla Chrome and
headless Chrome for detection, it is much harder to find
such differences compared to older headless browsers. Thus,
since there are fewer differences, it makes it easier for an
adversarial crawler developer to escape detection by altering
the fingerprint of her crawlers. Indeed, these changes require
few lines of code (less than 300 lines in the case of Crawler 6)
and can be done directly in JavaScript without the need to
modify and compile a whole Chromium browser.
B. Future of fingerprinting
One of the main challenges for fingerprinting-based de-
tection relates to the discovery of new rules. Fingerprinters
continuously need to define new rules to detect new browsers
or new versions of such browsers, as well as to detect crawlers
whose fingerprints have been intentionally modified. Since it
is a cumbersome and error-prone task, we argue that there
is a need for automation. Schwarz et al. [47] proposed an ap-
proach to automatically learn the differences between different
browsers running on different OSes. Their approach could be
applied to headless browsers and extended to take into account
more complex differences that require special objects to be
instantiated or functions that need to be called sequentially. We
also argue there is a need for more complex attributes whose
values are harder to spoof, based on APIs such as canvas,
WebGL or audio. Since a significant part of crawlers is run
from virtual machines in the cloud, we also argue in favor of
reliable red pills that can be executed in the browser.
C. Threats to Validity
While the goal of our study is to evaluate the effectiveness
of browser fingerprinting for crawler detection, a threat lies in
the possibility that we may have missed external techniques,
other than browser fingerprinting and the techniques presented
in Section II, that could have contributed to the detection of
crawlers. A second threat lies in the choice of our oracle—i.e.,
being blocked by a website when a crawler is detected. While
we ensured that all the websites used in the evaluation block
crawlers upon detection, it may have been caused by some
user agent blacklisting. Thus, we make the hypothesis that,
if fingerprinting was also used for crawler detection, then the
website would be consistent in its strategy against the crawlers.
However, it is possible that a website adopts fingerprinting
not against crawlers, but against credit card fraudsters or
to label crawlers in its analytics reports, and thus does not
focus on blocking crawlers. Finally, a possible threat lies in
our experimental framework. We did extensive testing of our
code, and we manually verified the data from our experiments.
However, as for any experimental infrastructure, there may be
bugs. We hope that they only change marginal quantitative
results and not the quality of our findings.
VII. CONCLUSION
Crawler detection has become widespread among popular
websites to protect their data. While existing approaches, such
as CAPTCHAs or trafic shape analysis, have been shown to
be effective, they either require the user to solve a difficult
problem, or they require enough data to accurately classify
the traffic.
In this paper, we show that, beyond its adoption for
tracking, browser fingerprinting is also used as a crawler
detection mechanism. We analyze the scripts from the main
fingerprinters present in the Alexa Top 10K and show that
they exploit the lack of browser features, errors or overridden
native functions to detect crawlers. Then, using 7 crawlers
that apply different modifications to their fingerprint, we
show that websites with fingerprinting are better and faster at
detecting crawlers compared to websites that use other state-
of-the-art detection techniques. Nevertheless, while 29.5%
of the evaluated websites are able to detect our most naive
crawler that applies only one change to its fingerprint, this
rate decreases to 2.5% for the most advanced crawler that
applies more extensive modifications to its fingerprint. We also
show that fingerprinting does not help detecting crawlers based
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